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Abstract 
 
What can the case of the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the European Union (EU) teach 
us about message framing effects and arguments that persuade citizens whether or not to support  
the EU? In this article, we report findings from an innovative online survey experiment based on a 
two-wave panel design. Our findings show that despite the expectation that campaign effects are 
small for high salience issues – such as Brexit – the potential for campaign effects were high for 
the pro-EU frames. This suggests that within an asymmetrical information environment – where 
the arguments for one side of an issue (anti-EU) are “priced in”, while arguments for the other side 
(pro-EU) have been understated – the potential for campaign effects in a single direction are 
substantial. To the extent that this environment is reflected in other referendum campaigns, the 
potential effect of pro-EU frames may be substantial. 
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1. Introduction 
Referendums on a country’s relations with the European Union (EU) are relatively common. 
The 23 June 2016 referendum on whether the United Kingdom should remain in or leave the 
EU was the 55th such referendum since 1972, and the 30th since 2000. In some respects, the 
UK’s  ‘remain-or-leave’ referendum was similar to other recent EU referendums.1 The vote 
was triggered by a party in government that was divided on Europe. Whereas most centrist 
voters generally supported the pro-EU side, most voters on the radical right and a significant 
portion on the radical left supported the anti-EU side. The referendum was also preceded by 
growing public support for a radical right and ‘hard’ Eurosceptic party, the UK Independence 
Party (UKIP).2  
In other respects, though, the 2016 UK referendum was different. Whereas most other 
EU referendums have been on reforms of the EU treaties, or on whether a country should join 
the EU or adopt the Euro single currency, the 2016 referendum was only the third on whether 
a country should remain in or leave the EU. The only other such ‘high stakes’ referendums 
were an earlier referendum in the UK, in 1975, when 67 per cent voted to stay in the then 
European Communities, and the Greenland referendum in 1982, when 54 per cent opted to 
leave the European Communities. Following the UK 2016 referendum, though, we may see 
similar in/out referendums in other member states. Several radical right parties in other EU 
states are campaigning for a ‘Cameron style’ referendum, for example.  
                                                1!For!example!see!Hug!2002!and!Hobolt!2009.!2!For!example!see!Werts,!Scheepers!and!Lubbers!2012.!
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We use the 2016 referendum to achieve two broad goals. First, we test theories of 
campaign effects in a context that is extraordinary from the context of most persuasion and 
framing studies. Such studies typically focus on low salience issues.3 This may be explained 
by the fact that persuasion and framing affects are expected to be weak for long-standing 
issues on which individuals have been given the time and information necessary to form and 
solidify their opinions.4 Little opinion change is expected for crystallized attitudes.5 Leaving 
or remaining in the EU is the type high salience issue for which we would expect crystallized 
attitudes and weak campaign effects. Even before the referendum, the issue of Europe and the 
UK’s EU membership was considered by voters to be the leading issue facing the country.6 
However, the UK referendum also represented a situation where substantial campaign effects 
were possible, because of the information asymmetry that existed prior to the campaign. On 
the one hand, before the referendum campaign, consumers of UK media had been exposed to 
at least forty years of Eurosceptic coverage. 7  Public concern over immigration and 
dissatisfaction with established politics had been targeted by UKIP, which won the 2014 
European Parliament elections and secured nearly 13 per cent of the vote in the 2015 general 
election.8 On the other hand, arguments regarding the positive effects of EU membership 
were far less prominent. Such arguments were made but received far less media attention. 
                                                3!Hopkins!and!Mummolo!2017!4!Zaller!1992!5!Tesler!2012;!Chong!and!Druckman!2010.!6!Data!from!the!IpsosMMORI!Issues!Index!tracker.!Available!online:!https://www.ipsos.com/ipsosMmori/enMuk/euMandMbrexitMseenMmostMimportantMissueMfacingMbritain?language_content_entity=enMuk!(accessed!July!17!2017).!7!Daddow!2012!8!Goodwin!and!Milazzo!2015!
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This created a situation in which argument frames that emphasized previously under-stressed 
considerations might have had an effect despite the high salience of the issue. That it was 
positive messages that had the potential for an effect, while negative messages did not, is 
particularly unusual. Negativity bias usually leads to greater mental attention to negative 
arguments relative to positive ones, leading to larger persuasion and framing effects.9 
Persuasion and framing effects in the context of the 2016 referendum may also have 
been larger than expected due to weak partisan cuing. When an issue is highly salient, each 
political party typically takes a clear position. When this happens, it is difficult to move 
partisans away from their partisan-consistent position. Hence, both persuasion and framing 
effects are expected to be small or nonexistent. Yet the 2016 Brexit referendum represented 
an unusual situation in which cues from the two major parties were unclear. Longstanding 
divisions within the incumbent Conservative Party were reflected in the fact that while 185 
Conservative MPs campaigned for ‘remain’, 138 declared support for ‘leave’. This divide 
extended to the very top of the party, as at least six Cabinet ministers campaigned for leave, 
including Mayor of London and Conservative MP Boris Johnson and Justice Secretary 
Michael Gove, alongside the UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, and ten Labour MPs.10 As for 
Labour, while an overwhelming majority of the party’s MPs were remain supporters, the 
party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, was lukewarm in his support, both because he was known to be 
critical of the EU and because he did not want to be seen to be supporting the Cameron 
                                                9!Soroka!2014!10!The!estimates!of!how!MPs!and!ministers!voted!is!taken!from!‘EU!vote:!Where!the!cabinet!and!other!MPs!stand’,!BBC!News!June!22!2016.!Available!online:!http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukMpoliticsMeuMreferendumM35616946!(accessed!January!3!2017).!
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government. As a result, at the beginning of the campaign, which is when we undertook our 
study, the Labour leadership’s position was unclear.  
In sum, the context of the 2016 EU referendum in the UK allows us to test persuasion 
and framing effects in a context in which the high salience of the issue would typically lead us 
to expect little to no effects, particularly for positive arguments, but the information 
asymmetry and the weak partisan cues of the environment leads us to expect strong effects. 
This is an atypical situation in which to test persuasion and framing effects and leads to some 
unique theoretical expectations. Empirically testing these expectations provides a strong test 
of what we believe we know about campaign effects.  
Even though the context of the Brexit referendum is extraordinary from the 
perspective of testing campaign effects, it does share some features in common with possible 
future in/out referendums. This allows us to achieve a second goal: to study the power of 
arguments used in the UK referendum to shed light not only on what happened in 2016 but 
also on what could happen in similar referendums in the future. In particular, our context 
allows us to examine whether relatively unfamiliar ‘pro-EU’ arguments, that stress the 
benefits of EU membership can sway public attitudes in the face of well-established ‘anti-EU’ 
arguments that have been prominent in the UK and other EU nations.  
We pursue these two goals via an online survey experiment, conducted between 
September and November 2015, just before the official referendum campaign began. The 
experiment included two innovative elements. First, it was designed in a way that allows us to 
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test the effects of different combinations of real-world arguments against each other during an 
actual campaign on public support for leaving/remaining in the EU. Second, the experiment 
was based on a ‘before and after’ design, using a two wave panel, which allows us to look at 
how individuals changed their opinions in response to a set of arguments. In the next section 
we set out our theoretical expectations, in section three we explain the design of our 
experiment, and in section four we present the results. We conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of our results for the campaign effects literature and for future referendums.  
Our main findings are that: 1) “pro-EU” arguments on their own (could have) 
significantly increased support for remaining in the EU while “anti-EU” arguments, which for 
decades have dominated the political and media debate about EU membership, and which we 
suggest were therefore “priced in”, had less potential to impact support for either side; 2) the 
effect of pro-EU arguments were mitigated when contrasted with anti-EU arguments, limiting 
the potential effectiveness of pro-EU arguments in an environment of competing pro-/anti-
messages; 3) the effect of both pro- and anti-EU arguments were greatest amongst those 
whose prior beliefs were consistent with the argument; and 4) the effect of pro-EU arguments 
were greatest amongst those with lower political knowledge (less education). 
 
2. Theory 
! 8!
Media, politicians and campaigns can portray information in different ways, stressing certain 
evaluations or parts of an argument.11 Our research on the effect of different arguments on EU 
membership is rooted in existing research on persuasion, and how the ‘framing’ of issues can 
affect public opinion and vote choices generally, as well as research on how such framing can 
shape attitudes towards the EU specifically.  
It is well established in political science that frames select and organize information 
on issues, give meaning, attribute positive or negative values and can influence attitudes. 
Frames supply a readily comprehensible basis on which to think about the issue and how to 
justify what should be done about it.12 A framing effect occurs when individuals who are 
exposed to different frames arrive at different positions on the issue, depending on the priority 
given to various considerations in the frame; effects that can also be persistent.13  
When we consider the effects of different arguments that are made for remaining in or 
leaving the EU, we view these arguments as frames and are interested in the effects of the 
different considerations raised in the different frames.14 There are a number of psychological 
processes that determine whether a consideration has an effect on opinion. In testing the 
effects of different arguments, we manipulate two of these: availability and accessibility.15 
For a consideration to have an effect, it must be available in an individual’s memory and it 
must be accessible (front-of-mind) to be applied to the current situation.  
                                                11!Schuck!and!de!Vreese!2006!12!Sniderman!and!Theriault!2004!13!Druckman!and!Nelson!2003:730;!on!frame!persistence!see!Lecheler!and!de!Vreese!2011!14!Chong!and!Druckman!2007;!see!also!Berinsky!and!Kinder!2006!15!!Bless,!Fielder!and!Strack!2004!
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Framing studies typically argue that they manipulate the accessibility of different 
considerations by presenting research participants with different arguments.16 However, there 
exists a debate about whether these framing studies manipulate the availability or accessibility 
of considerations. That is, whether exposing individuals to frames makes new information 
available or makes information that was already available to them accessible.17 The effect of 
the latter (accessibility) is typically considered a framing effect and that of the former 
(availability) a persuasion effect. We remain somewhat agnostic about this distinction, and 
argue that when we expose respondents to our frames, this has the potential to both make new 
information available and pre-existing information accessible. Given the salience of the issue 
of remaining in or leaving the EU leading into the referendum, we expect that most arguments 
were already available and our arguments primarily manipulated accessibility. In other words, 
any detected effects are framing effects. However, given the pre-existing asymmetry in the 
volume of claims made regarding the negative and positive consequences of remaining in the 
EU, it is possible that the pro-EU arguments increased availability. In other words, pro-EU 
arguments may have also produced a persuasion effect. 
Consistent with a campaign in which two camps advocate diametrically opposed 
positions (i.e. whether to remain in, or leave, the EU), we view the relevant arguments as 
“valence frames”. As Lecheler and de Vreese observe, this valence alludes to one of the most 
fundamental aspects of political discourse, namely that political elites try to influence public 
                                                16!Chong!and!Druckman!2007!17!Lenz!2009;!Leeper!and!Slothuus!2015!
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reactions to an issue by emphasizing the positive or negative aspects of it, such as the positive 
or negative features of EU membership.18 As past studies observe, with regard to framing and 
the EU “[t]he basic finding of two decades of research is that political communications that 
frame European integration in terms of its benefits increase public support for European 
integration, while messages that frame it in terms of costs, risks or cultural threats lower 
support for European integration”.19  
Indeed, a growing number of experimental studies investigate frames as they relate to 
EU issues and how they impact on public attitudes. Abbarno and Zapryanova randomly 
exposed respondents in the UK and Bulgaria to a “cultural threat” or “democratic deficit” 
frame, finding that both reduced support for EU integration. 20  Schuck and de Vreese 
demonstrate how news media frequently use “risk” and “opportunity” frames when discussing 
the issue of EU enlargement, frames that are shown to have significant effects on citizens that 
are, in turn, moderated by political knowledge.21 Studying attitudes toward Turkey’s possible 
EU membership, de Vreese et al. show how in that case negative frames yielded stronger 
effects than positive frames, though more politically sophisticated citizens were more affected 
by positive frames, providing some evidence attitudes can be shaped by the framing of the 
issue in interaction with individual characteristics.22 Overall, pro- and anti-EU economic, 
                                                18!de!Vreese!and!Boomgaarden!2003;!Lecheler!and!de!Vreese!2011.!19!Abbarno!and!Zapryanova!2013:!583;!also!see!de!Vreese!2004,!2005;!Gabel!and!Scheve!2007;!Medrano!2003;!Schuck!and!de!Vreese!2006!20!Abbarno!and!Zapryanova!2013;!cf.!McLaren!2002;!Werts!et!al.!2012!21!Schuck!and!de!Vreese!2006!22!de!Vreese!et!al.!2011!
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cultural and political frames have the potential to increase or decrease support for remaining 
in the EU. 
The magnitude of a framing effect depends on the context. We argue that one way in 
which context matters is that if certain considerations are already highly available and 
accessible to the individual, exposure to frames that contain those considerations will have 
little effect. Under such circumstances, those considerations are already “priced in” – already 
accessible and available. This is particularly relevant to a situation in which one side of an 
argument may have dominated the dialogue for an extended period of time. Given Britain’s 
long tradition of Euroscepticism, we expect that new pro-EU frames that are not “priced in” to 
the debate will have a greater effect on vote choice than older and more familiar anti-EU 
frames. On that basis, we hypothesize that pro-EU frames will increase support for remaining 
in the EU while anti-EU frames will have little effect. 
Another way in which context could matter is particularily relevant to a campaign in 
which two opposing sides make competing claims. The effect of a frame may differ 
depending upon whether the individual is simultaneously being exposed to competing frames. 
When individuals receive competing frames, they may choose the side that is consistent with 
their prior beliefs.23 On the other hand, if an individual contrasts competing frames, this can 
result in the individual taking an intermediate position. The effect of one frame is mitigated 
by the opposing frame, resulting in weak effects.24 We anticipate that both of these effects are 
                                                23!Sniderman!and!Theriault!2004!24!See!Chong!and!Druckman!2007!
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relevant. We hypothesize that exposure to competing frames mitigates the effects of framing. 
At the same time, frames will have stronger effects if they are consistent with prior beliefs.25 
Therefore, we hypothesize that pro-EU frames will be more effective amongst people who 
previously expressed positive EU sentiment and/or those who identify as Labour supporters, 
while anti-EU frames will be more effective amongst people who previously expressed 
negative EU sentiment and/or who are Conservative identifiers.26 
The magnitude of a framing effect also depends on other characteristics of the 
recipient of the frame. Consistent with extant research, we expect that exposure to frames will 
have stronger effects on the less knowledgeable by making considerations available and 
accessible that were previously not accessible, something found in studies of framing and EU 
issues. 27  Amongst the more knowledgeable these considerations are likely to already be 
highly available and accessible and so little effect is expected from exposure to frames that 
contain these considerations. Lecheler and de Vreese (2010) find evidence of this type of 
moderating effect for knowledge when examining the effects of news framing on support for 
EU enlargement. Using education as a proxy for knowledge (Luskin 1990; Carpini and Keeter 
1997), we hypothesize that framing effects will be stronger amongst the less educated. 
This consequently leads us to the following hypotheses: 
1.! Anti-EU frames, which are likely to already be highly available and accessible 
(priced-in), will have less of an effective than pro-EU frames. 
                                                25!Druckman!2001!26!Hobolt!2007;!Van!Elsas!et!al.!2015.!27!See!Chong!and!Druckman!2007:639;!in!terms!of!EU!issues!see!Schuck!and!de!Vreese!2006!
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2.! In a context in which there are competing frames, the effect of each frame will be 
mitigated, resulting in weak effects. 
3.! Frames consistent with prior beliefs will have stronger effects.  
4.! The effect of frames will be greatest on those with less knowledge/education. 
 
3. Experimental design 
We test these hypotheses in an innovative, online population-based experiment that combines 
the strengths of laboratory experiments and national surveys.28  By randomly assigning a 
sample of the adult population to different treatments we can identify the causal effects of 
being exposed to different types of arguments on support for EU membership. Conducting 
our experiment on a sample designed to reflect the national population, we can also estimate 
the magnitude of these effects on the population as a whole.29  
The experiment was designed to simulate the ‘real world’ campaign environment, by 
exposing respondents to a combination of different frames, in the form of vignettes, about the 
UK’s EU membership, and which they might realistically receive in the referendum 
campaign, due to start shortly after our experiment. Our experiment reflects the real world in 
two ways. First, we use vignettes that include competing frames with different vignettes 
placing different weights on the two sides of the argument. Chong and Druckman (2007) note 
that there is little literature on the effect of competing frames. Sniderman and Theriault 
                                                28!Mutz!2011!29!Previous!studies!that!use!an!experimental!design!to!study!EU!attitudes!include:!Schuck!and!de!Vreese!2011;!Maier!and!Rittberger!2008!who!use!lab!experiments;!Schuck!and!de!Vreese!2012;!Adriaansen!et!al.!2012;!Lecheler!and!de!Vreese!2010;!Kumlin!2011;!Bruter!2009;!and!Abbarno!and!Zapryanova!2013,!who!used!survey!experiments.!De!Vreese!2004!specifically!used!a!twoMwave!framing!experiment.!
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(2004), and Brewer and Gross (2005) examine competing frames but only with equal 
exposure to both. Of course, in reality arguments are rarely equal in exposure. Second, our 
experimental vignettes were inspired by real world arguments used by the two sides of the 
debate only a few months before the referendum. Following past research on the effect of 
information on EU attitudes (Maier and Rittberger 2008), our vignettes include cultural, 
economic and political messages. Also following past research (Maier et al 2012) these 
messages were based on leaflets, speeches or websites associated with the pro-EU/Remain or 
the anti-EU/Leave campaigns, thereby maximizing the generalizability of the results to the 
referendum. The arguments were tailored so that the length of each was approximately equal 
with roughly equivalent amounts of information. The primary variation across treatments was 
the direction of the argument (i.e. pro-EU or anti-EU) rather than the amount of information. 
Our vignettes purposely did not include the source of the considerations presented. This 
allowed us to estimate the effects of the considerations uncontaminated by cueing from the 
source. The vignettes are shown in Online Appendix I. 
Our experiment used a 2x2x2 full factorial design, in which each respondent was 
exposed to a vignette composed of: 1) a ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ EU cultural frame; plus 2) a ‘pro’ or 
‘anti’ EU economic frame; plus 3) a ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ EU political aframe. One ninth of 
respondents were assigned to each of the eight possible treatment groups and one ninth was 
assigned to a control group, which was not exposed to any vignette. 30  Because every 
                                                30!In!our!design,!each!respondent!is!assigned!to!only!one!treatment!(or!to!the!control!group),!unlike!a!conjoint!design!where!the!individual!is!exposed!to!a!series!of!treatments.!Such!a!design!would!be!
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treatment contains three frames, we are able to estimate the impact of different combinations 
of arguments holding the number of frames constant.  
The full factorial design allows us to estimate the effect of: arguments containing 
frames all in the same direction (all pro-or all anti-EU); arguments with competing frames 
(some pro-and some anti-EU); and arguments with different weights placed on the two sides 
(a varying number of pro-EU and anti-EU arguments). This, in turn, allows us to test our 
hypotheses regarding the effects of different types and combinations of frames. The 
experiment was conducted before the confirmation of the date of the referendum and the 
conclusion of EU reform negotiations, hence minimizing external contamination. 
The population-based experiment was conducted as a two-wave panel study. The 
panel study was conducted by YouGov, with the first wave conducted between September 24 
and October 1 2015 and the second wave conducted two weeks later between October 16 and 
November 9 2015. The first wave included 6,074 completions. With a retention rate of 87.8 
per cent the second wave sample included 5,333 respondents, with approximately 590 
respondents per group.31 Further information about the sample, including balance tests, can be 
found in Online Appendix II. Once data were collected we proceeded with a difference-in-
differences analysis. This allows us to estimate the average change in referendum vote 
intention before and after exposure to a vignette, for individuals in the eight treatment groups 
                                                                                                                                                   inappropriate!for!our!purposes!as!the!vignettes!do!not!reference!a!hypothetical!and!so!once!a!respondent!is!exposed!to!one!vignette,!we!cannot!reasonably!ask!them!to!forget!the!arguments!to!which!they!were!just!exposed!in!order!to!determine!the!effect!of!exposing!them!to!a!new!vignette.!31!Group!sizes!range!from!551!to!652.!See!Table!A6!in!online!Appendix!III!for!a!breakdown!of!the!group!sizes.!
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(the eight argument combinations), compared to the change in referendum vote intention for 
individuals in the control group. 
In the first wave, vote intention was measured using a standard referendum voting 
intention question: “How would you vote if the referendum on Britain’s membership of the 
EU were held tomorrow? (Remain in the EU / Leave the EU / Don’t Know)”. In the second 
wave, respondents were assigned to one of the vignettes (8 treatment groups) or to the control 
group. Respondents were then immediately asked the same vote intention question. 
The panel structure allows us to measure the referendum vote intention before and 
after exposure to the vignettes. This provides us with a within-subject design, allowing us to 
estimate the change in opinion, for each individual, due to exposure to a vignette, relative to 
those who were not exposed to any vignette (the control group). For example, we estimate the 
average change in referendum vote intention for individuals exposed to a vignette with three 
pro-EU frames compared to the change in referendum vote intention for individuals in the 
control group. We also did this for individuals exposed to vignettes with the following 
combination of arguments: two pro/one anti; one pro/two anti; and three anti. The within-
subject design also affords greater power in determining the effects than with a between-
subjects design.32  
The two-week period between wave 1 and wave 2 was designed to prevent 
respondents from thinking about their reported vote intention (in wave 1) when reporting their 
vote intention (in wave 2) after exposure to the vignette. This reduced the probability of 
                                                32!Keren!2014!
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suppressing the effect of a vignette as respondents attempt to appear consistent. Contrasting 
the change for each treatment group against a control allows us to control for any universal 
changes in vote intention in the intervening two weeks. 
 
4. Results 
In the first wave, 38.2 percent of respondents indicated they would vote to remain in the EU, 
43.9 percent indicated they would vote to leave, and 17.9 percent indicated they did not know 
or would not vote. In the second wave, amongst those in the control group and not exposed to 
any set of arguments, these results changed slightly to 37.1 percent, 44.0 percent and 18.8 
percent respectively. To illustrate the magnitudes of the shifts across the two waves, Figure 
A1 in Online Appendix VI shows the “flows” from Remain/Leave/Don’t Know in wave 1 and 
wave 2 for the control group and the two most extreme treatment groups: those exposed to 
three pro-EU arguments; and those exposed to three anti-EU arguments. 
To quantify and test the statistical significance of the average change in referendum 
vote intention before and after respondents were exposed to a particular combination of the 
arguments we estimate the following: 
∆"#$%& = () + +$,%-$.%/$& + 0& 
where ∆"#$%& is the change in vote intention from wave one to wave two for respondent 1; $,%-$.%/$& is a binary variable equalling 0 if the respondent was in the control group and 1 
if the respondent was exposed to that particular combination of arguments. Respondents 
exposed to a different combination of arguments were not included in this particular estimate. 
! 18!
Separate equations were estimated for changes in vote between Remain and some other vote 
(Leave or no vote), and for changes in vote between Leave and some other vote, and between 
no vote and some other vote. In each case, the coefficient + is the estimate of the average 
change in vote intention for those exposed to the combination of arguments, relative to the 
control group. This is our estimate of the effect of the vignette. Doing this for each of the 
eight possible combinations of arguments gives us an estimate of the effect of each of the 
eight vignettes.  
Figure 1 plots the estimated effects of each vignette on Remain and Leave vote 
intention (the full model estimates are provided in Online Appendix V).33 Exposure to three 
pro-EU arguments produced a statistically significant (P-value<0.05) increase in support for 
remaining in the EU and a decrease in support for leaving the EU. The increase in the Remain 
vote was 5.2 percentage points and the decrease in the Leave vote was 3.6 percentage points. 
There was no corresponding statistically significant effect for the three anti-EU arguments. 
None of the vignettes with any combination of anti-EU arguments produced a statistically 
significant effect on referendum voting intention. Meanwhile, in addition to a positive effect 
from the three pro-EU arguments, the ‘pro-cultural, pro-economic, anti-political’ vignette 
produced a statistically significant change in the vote. It increased public support for Remain 
and decreased support for Leave by 3.1 percentage points. Other vignettes that included pro-
and anti-EU arguments did not produce a statistical significance effect. 
                                                33!The!results!do!not!change!if!we!drop!all!respondents!in!the!8!treatment!groups!who!took!less!than!90!seconds!to!complete!the!whole!test!and!therefore!may!have!not!read!the!vignettes!with!much!care.!
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Having determined that some vignettes that included pro-EU arguments produced 
statistically significant results, we then estimated specifically the effects of different vignettes 
depending on the number of pro- versus anti-EU arguments. We estimated separately the 
effects of all vignettes with three pro-EU arguments, vignettes with two pro- and one anti-EU 
argument, vignettes with one pro- and two anti-EU, and vignettes with three anti-EU 
arguments. In addition to allowing us to further examine the differential effect of pro-and 
anti-EU frames, this allowed us to compare the effect of exposing respondents to non-
competing frames (all negative or all positive) to that of exposing respondents to competing 
frames with different weights placed on each sides of the argument. Figure 2 reveals again 
how the vignette with three pro-EU arguments produced a statistically significant effect, as 
did vignettes with two pro-and one anti-EU arguments (our full results are reported in the 
Appendix V). These latter vignettes increased public support for remaining in the EU by a 
statistically significance 2.3 percentage points. Their effect on support for Leave was not 
statistically significant. Overall, vignettes that were predominantly pro-EU in tone had a 
statistically significant effect on referendum vote choice while the vignettes that conveyed 
anti-EU messages did not.34 This is consistent with our first hypothesis. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                34!If!we!examine!the!effects!of!each!argument!separately!(averaging!over!the!other!arguments!with!which!it!is!combined),!we!see!that!each!of!the!proMEU!arguments!increases!the!level!of!public!support!for!remain!(PMvalue<0.1)!–!see!Table!A6!in!the!Appendix.!In!the!case!of!the!political!proMEU!argument,!there!was!also!a!decrease!in!support!for!leave.!Overall!though,!there!is!not!much!to!distinguish!the!effects!of!the!different!different! proMEU! arguments.! The! main! distinction! is! between! proM! and! antiMEU! arguments,! with! little!evidence!of!the!latter!having!an!effect.!!
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Does this mean that anti-EU arguments had no effect? We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that anti-EU arguments had no effect, while we can reject the null hypothesis that 
pro-EU arguments had no effect. To test whether this is because anti-EU arguments have no 
effect, rather than because we do not have the power to detect their effect, we provide a test of 
the following null hypothesis: vignettes with two or more pro-EU arguments have no more of 
an effect (in the positive direction) than vignettes with two or more anti-EU arguments (in the 
negative direction). This is a test of the difference in the magnitudes of anti-EU vignette 
effects against the pro-EU vignette effects. At the 0.05 level (one-sided), we can reject this 
null hypothesis for the proportion indicating that they would vote Remain (z score=0.046; P-
value=0.04).35 For the Remain vote, we have evidence that the magnitude of the effect of pro-
EU arguments was greater than the effect of anti-EU arguments and, in fact, no evidence that 
anti-EU arguments had any effect. Overall, this is strong evidence for our suggestion that anti-
EU arguments (on average) had no effect while pro-EU arguments did. 
 
Result 1: consistent with our first hypothesis that priced in considerations will not have an 
effect, anti-EU frames have less of an effective than pro-EU frames. 
 
Figure 2 also reveals that while a purely pro-EU vignette had an effect on the proportion 
indicating they would vote Remain or Leave, a vignette containing two pro-EU frames and 
                                                35!We!cannot!reject!the!null!hypothesis!for!the!proportion!indicating!they!would!vote!to!leave!(z!score=M0.011;!PMvalue=0.62)!or!who!don’t!know!how!to!vote!(z!score=M.035;!PMvalue=0.245).!To!reduce!standard!errors,!we!include!in!the!analysis!the!following!preMtreatment!variables:!age,!social!class,!region,!party!ID!and!EU!attitudes!in!wave!one.!
! 21!
one anti-EU frame had less of an effect. Further, a vignette containing only one pro-EU frame 
and two anti-EU frames had no effect. The effect of the pro-EU frames was reduced when 
competing anti-EU frames were combined in the vignette.36 
 
Result 2: consistent with our second hypothesis, when there are competing frames, the effect 
of each frame is mitigated, resulting in weak effects. 
 
Next, to examine the effect of prior attitudes on the effectiveness of pro- and anti-EU frames, 
we conducted two tests. First, we examined how effects differed among those who previously 
declared moderate feelings towards the EU, those who said they held extremely negative 
feelings, and those with extremely positive feelings. The left panel of Figure 3 plots the 
distribution of EU attitudes by those who indicated that they intended to vote Remain, Leave 
or Don’t Know in wave 1. Attitudes were measured on a 0 to 10 scale with 10 indicating the 
most positive and 0 indicating the most negative attitudes towards the EU. The negative end 
of the spectrum (0-3) was almost entirely populated by those who intend to vote leave and the 
positive end of the spectrum (7-10) was almost entirely populated by those who intend to vote 
remain. The moderate values (4-6) were a mixture of all three positions, with the centre 
dominated by those who did not know how they would vote.  
 [FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                36!it!is!also!possible!that!the!weaker!effect!is!due!to!fewer!proMEU!arguments.!
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 On the basis of this distribution, we defined three groups of individuals based on their 
EU attitudes: anti-EU extremists; EU moderates; and pro-EU extremists.37 Figure 3, presents 
the estimated effects of the vignettes on these three groups of individuals. We see that, as 
before, anti-EU arguments did not have any effect. On the other hand, either three or two pro-
EU arguments increased the Remain vote amongst pro-EU extremists and EU moderates but 
not amongst the anti-EU extremists. This increase in the Remain vote came largely through a 
decrease in those indicating they did not know how they would vote. As expected, those with 
priors consistent (or at least not inconsistent) with the frames were most affected by them. 
Somewhat counter to expectations, there was some effect of the pro-EU frames on 
anti-EU extremists. This effect was to decrease the Leave vote by increasing those that did not 
know how they would vote. What we are observing is a limitation on the effect of a frame 
depending on the strength of the priors of the individual. Those that had the most negative EU 
attitudes could be moved from a Leave vote to an undecided position and those with the most 
positive EU attitudes could be moved from an undecided position to a Remain vote. However 
individuals with extreme (pro- or anti- EU) attitudes were unlikely to be moved all the way 
from a Remain to a Leave vote or vice versa.  
Our second test of how prior attitudes moderate the effectiveness of pro- and anti-EU 
frames, examined how the effects of the vignettes differed by partisan identity. Figure 4 panel 
A shows the effects of the vignettes on respondents who self-identified as Conservative or 
                                                37!For!the!estimation!we!overlapped!the!categories,!so!that!0M3!=!antiMEU!extremists,!3M7!=!EU!moderates,!and!7M10!=!proMEU!extremists.!!We!did!this!so!that!the!three!categories!were!broadly!the!same!size!and!also!because!it!is!unclear!whether!positions!3!and!7!are!“moderate”!or!“extreme”.!
! 23!
Labour Party identifiers. Conservative identifiers were not affected by pro-EU arguments; 
they were only moved away from Remain and towards Leave by the combination of three 
anti-EU messages. Labour identifiers, however, were moved by pro-EU arguments but not 
anti-EU arguments. The combination of either three pro-EU arguments or only two such 
arguments moved Labour supporters away from saying they don’t know how they would vote 
and towards voting Remain. This is consistent with our expectations that those that identified 
as Labour would have prior attitudes that made them more susceptible to pro-EU frames and 
those that identified as Conservative would have prior attitudes that made them more 
susceptible to anti-EU frames. 
 
Finding 3: in support of our third hypothesis, frames consistent with prior beliefs have 
stronger effects.  
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
  
Finally, we examined education as a moderator of the effects of the vignettes. We made the 
assumption that those with higher levels of education would, on average, have high levels of 
political knowledge (Luskin 1990; Carpini and Keeter 1997). As shown in Figure 4, panel B, 
we fould that three or two pro-EU arguments increased the remain vote only amongst those 
with the lowest levels of education (<17 years).38 There were no other effects for the higher 
                                                38!Due!to!larger!standard!errors,!only!the!vignette!with!three!proMEU!arguments!results!in!a!statistically!significant!decrease!in!the!Leave!vote!amongst!this!group.!
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levels of education, except for  a decrease in Remain and an increase in Leave due to three 
anti-EU arguments amongst the middle education category  (17-19 years). To the extent that 
education correlates with level of political knowledge, it does appear as though those with 
lower levels of political knowledge were more likely to be affected by frames that made 
information available and accessible. 
 
Finding 4: consistent with hypothesis four, the effect of both pro- and anti-EU frames are 
strongest for those with the least knowledge/education. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this article we have sought to build and expand upon existing research on persuasion and 
framing effects, on public attitudes toward the EU, voting behaviour and referendums. Our 
experimental design allowed us to test for the effect of “real world” arguments on both sides 
of the referendum campaign that attempted to influence the vote through an array of pro-EU 
or anti-EU messages. Our main finding is that, amid one of the most Eurosceptic states in the 
EU, pro-EU arguments had the potential to significantly increase support for remaining in the 
EU while anti-EU arguments had less potential to impact support for either remaining or 
leaving. Our results suggest that in more recent years the well-rehearsed arguments about the 
perceived costs, risks and threats from the EU became “priced in” to the national debate about 
continued EU membership. Having experienced several decades of a Eurosceptic tabloid 
press, an established current of Conservative Euroscepticism, and the rise of the Eurosceptic 
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radical right UKIP, it is perhaps not surprising that participants in our survey were less 
strongly influenced by prominent Eurosceptic arguments than hitherto less well-known 
messages about the benefits of EU membership. In contrast, our results suggest that 
communicating the claimed benefits and advantages of EU membership to an electorate that 
had long been noted for its instinctive Euroscepticism, might have had a significant impact on 
the overall vote.  
In terms of testing theories of campaign effects, our results suggest that even though 
campaign effects are generally expected to be small when the issue(s) at stake is(are) highly 
salient, under conditions of information asymmetry coupled with low partisan cuing, the 
potential for a campaign effect in a single direction is substantial. The one sidedness of the 
potential effect is important because it is under these circumstances that a campaign can have 
a decisive effect on the outcome. Our results are also important by demonstrating that the high 
salience of the issues at stake in a campaign do not necessarily mean that all information is 
already available and accessible and that the electorate is immune to the way in which an 
argument is framed. Important campaign effects are still possible in referendums on highly 
salient issues. 
In terms of shedding light on the power of arguments used in the UK referendum and 
similar referendums in the future, our results suggest that certain groups might have been 
especially receptive to pro-EU frames, notably Labour Party supporters, people under 26 (see 
Online Appendix VI), people with lower levels of education, and those undecided about their 
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EU referendum vote. Our results also suggest that pro-EU arguments weakened opposition to 
the EU among the most fervently committed Eurosceptics and increased support for Remain 
among more moderate voters. While we find little evidence that pro-EU arguments resulted in 
“direct switching” between the two camps, our results suggest that the campaign to keep the 
UK in the EU held important advantages, if it had focused on a clear and consistent pro-EU 
message. 
Given that public attitudes toward EU membership were highly polarized and finely 
balanced before the referendum, such that the way the respective cases were framed could 
have made all the difference, our results suggest that it might have been a mistake for the 
Remain campaign to focus primarily on the potential economic costs of leaving the EU – 
which the Leave campaign dismissed as “Project Fear” – rather than making a positive case 
for remaining in the EU. That said, it is important to note that the effectiveness of pro-EU 
arguments are mitigated when they compete with anti-EU considerations. Therefore, a pro-
EU campaign would have had to dominate the anti-EU message in order to be effective. 
Further, it must be acknowledge that a Conservative Party leadership that had been critical of 
the EU for three decades could not have credibly led such a strong pro-EU Remain campaign. 
This credibility trap might be absent in other EU member states facing possible in/out 
referendums, where elites could perhaps make pro-EU economic, political or cultural 
arguments.  On the other hand, anti-EU arguments may still be effective in countires that have 
not experienced the UK’s long tradition of Euroscepticism.  
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Overall, an important implication of our work is that in the context of information 
asymmetry and weak partisan cues, it is valuable to identify which arguments have become 
commonplace and which have not. Commonplace arguments may be effective at holding 
public opinion in place but will be ineffective at shifting opinion during a referendum 
campaign. Arguments that have been typically understated have the potential to deliver a 
substantial impact. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Difference-in-differences effects of the treatments 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the effect of a treatment on the change in support for Remain (Leave) relative 
to the change in support for Remain (Leave) in the control group.  The full results are in Table A4 in 
the Appendix.  
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Figure 2. Difference-in-differences effects of the relative volume of arguments 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the average effect of the relative volume of Pro/Anti EU arguments on the 
change in support for Remain (Leave) relative to the change in support for Remain (Leave) in the 
control group.  The full results are in Table A6 in Online Appendix V. 
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Figure 3. Extremists and Moderates 
 
 
     
Note: The left had figure shows the distribution of respondents on a 0-10 Anti-/Pro-EU scale.  The right hand figure shows the average effect of each group of treatments on 
the change in support for Remain/Don’t Know/Leave relative to the change in support for Remain/Don’t Know/Leave in the control group.  EU moderates were coded as at 
points 3,4,5,6,7; Anti-EU extremists at points 0,1,2,3; and Pro-EU extremists at points 7,8,9,10.  The full results are in Table A12 in Online Appendix V. 
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Figure 4. Difference-in-differences effects by subgroup 
 
 
 A. by party support B. by age finished education 
  
  
   
 
 
Note: Each figure shows the average effect of each group of treatments on the change in support for Remain/Don’t Know/Leave relative to the change in support for 
Remain/Don’t Know/Leave in the control group.  The full results are in Table A13 in Online Appendix V. 
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